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Delaware Private Arbitration: An Explanation of Delaware's
Chancery Arbitration Program and Its Benefits
Gregory Varallo
John Mark Zeberkiewicz
SAM FAYE: Moving on, it is my pleasure to present Mr. Greg
Varallo and Mr. John Mark Zeberkiewicz. Both of them are here
from Wilmington, Delaware where the majority of their practices re-
volve around a variety of corporate matters.
Both of these gentlemen are familiar with the private arbitration
program that the State of Delaware recently passed but declared un-
constitutional. But they're here to present their opinion of the pro-
gram, their involvement in it, and the possible outcomes and effects
that may come.
GREGORY VARALLO: Thanks, Sam. Thank you very much for
the kind welcome. Before I start, let me just say that John Mark and I
do a fair amount of speaking around the country, and it's been our
experience that these things are best when they're interactive. So let's
consider ourselves to be in a seminar or a classroom, and to the extent
anybody has questions, comments, or just wants us to stop and dilate
on a subject, please, just speak up. Merely because we're sitting at a
different table doesn't mean that you shouldn't have the opportunity
to jump in. We will be jumping, stepping on each other as we try to
make it as interactive as possible.
My name is Greg Varallo. I'm with Richards, Layton & Finger in
Wilmington, Delaware, where I've practiced for about thirty years,
primarily in corporate governance and related litigation.
Sam's invitation to us to speak came at an unusual time. Our firm,
and John Mark and I in particular, has been enmeshed in most of the
private arbitrations in Delaware. But as he mentioned, that regime
had been enjoined, and it had been enjoined relatively recently prior
to Sam's invitation.
So when we were invited, our first reaction was sure, we'd love to
speak about the program, but Sam, did you know that the program
was enjoined and we might not be au courant by the time we get to
your seminar? We were assured that he really wanted to hear about
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our experiences and about the program broadly, so we agreed to
come.
And basically what we're going to do today is speak a little to the
historical background, that is, how we got here. But I want to start by
putting this in context-Why does it matter what Delaware's doing?
How does it fit within the broad sort of ADR developments nationally
and internationally? And then perhaps where might we be going in
the future.
As we walk through that, I want to start by talking about Delaware
broadly and how ADR fits. Secondly, our initial foray into court-an-
nexed mediation, and then turn to this arbitration program, and fi-
nally lessons learned from the first year in arbitration.
So with that as background on where we will be going, we'll be
dividing this up and going back and forth as we go. And again, please
jump in if you have questions. So how does this fit? What's the con-
text, why Delaware, why is it important, and what's the background?
If I were you, I'd be asking those questions.
I think in many ways, Delaware's private arbitration program is one
small entrepreneurial state's next step in attempting to secure its posi-
tion at the forefront of complex business dispute resolution. Our busi-
ness law model broadly conceived really drives about a quarter of the
state's annual revenue. So it's of extraordinary importance to us.
It's, in fact, substantially more important than many of the state
taxes that are levied on our physical citizens rather than our juridical
citizens, and that system is built on more than a century's extraordi-
nary cooperation between bench, bar, and legislature.
The Delaware General Corporation Law was first adopted in 1899.
We copied it wholesale from New Jersey, as Nevada copied it whole-
sale from us in the 1970s. But we have a system which is based not
only on the 1899 corporation law, but a corporation law which is alive
and which grows and accommodates clients' needs every single year.
There's a process where experts at the bar propose new changes to
the General Corporation Law every year. Those changes are sent
down to the General Assembly, our legislature, and there is a broad
unwritten understanding that the General Assembly will hold hear-
ings and then adopt those changes verbatim without adding or sub-
tracting a thing.
It's worked for over 100 years; it works extremely well, and it is
ongoing today. John Mark, do you want to talk for a few minutes
about how that system works?
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JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: Essentially the process works as
follows: The Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware
State Bar Association, which is composed primarily of experienced
attorneys from law firms throughout the state who appear on both
sides of the v., receives on a fairly regular basis, whether from its own
members or from other attorneys within the firms represented on the
Council, suggestions for proposed amendments to the General Corpo-
ration Law of the State of Delaware.
The Council meets on a regular basis and considers these proposed
amendments. In some cases, the proposed amendments are minor
"clarifying" or "confirming" amendments that are intended to dis-
pense with a potential ambiguity. In other cases, the proposed amend-
ments are significant and would represent major shifts in the law. In
the latter cases, the Council will often form a subcommittee to study
the issue, make recommendations whether to proceed with the pro-
posed amendments and, if so, draft the proposed legislation. In many
cases, the subcommittees, when formed, meet frequently over a pe-
riod of several months (and sometimes years), turning numerous
drafts of proposed legislation. Once the subcommittee has completed
its work, it will present the final proposed legislation to the full Coun-
cil, members of which may then have additional questions or com-
ments requiring further review and drafting. I have had the
opportunity to participate in two subcommittee processes, and I can
say, from my experience, that a substantial amount of time and effort
goes into the preparation of proposed legislation.
By the time a proposed piece of legislation has been finally ap-
proved by the Council, it is in the form of a bill that is ready to be
submitted to the Delaware General Assembly. The bill is then spon-
sored by one or more legislators. The sponsor or sponsors will shep-
herd the bill through the appropriate committees, following which it is
submitted to a vote in Delaware's Senate and House of Representa-
tives. In the span of my career, I have not seen much debate on the
bills in the General Assembly. In fact, I am aware of only one in-
stance in which there was significant debate. That was when section
203, which is Delaware's antitakeover statute, was adopted back in
1988.1 Leading up to the adoption of section 203, there was substan-
tial debate over the scope and application of the section, particularly
whether corporations were going to be required to opt-in or opt-out of
it.
1. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (West 2013).
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Many of the transcripts of the hearings, as well as the letters from
various constituencies lobbying their particular views on the statute,
are available and provide an interesting window into the adoption of
that particular amendment. Other than that, though, there is really
not much debate over the bills in any year and, as a result, there is
scant legislative history for amendments to the General Corporation
Law.
I will tell you in my career, I've never seen much debate at all at the
legislature. I'm only aware of one situation where there was a huge
debate, and that was back when section 203, which is Delaware's an-
titakeover statute, when that was adopted back in the mid-1980s,
there was substantial debate and all of the transcripts of the hearings
and the letters that went back and forth are available.
By way of example, I went down to the General Assembly in 2010
to present the proposed amendments to the General Corporation Law
that year and to address questions regarding the amendments. The
package of amendments included various changes to section 145 of
the General Corporation Law,2 which is a fundamental section of the
statute dealing with indemnification and advancement of expenses for
a corporation's directors, officers, employees, and agents. The pack-
age also included a new section of the General Corporation Law, sec-
tion 267,3 which would enable limited liability companies to effect a
short-form merger with a 90%-owned corporation. Finally, the pack-
age included substantial amendments to Delaware's nonstock corpo-
ration law.
There are thousands upon thousands of Delaware stock corpora-
tions, including 60% of the Fortune 500. There are 20,000 to 30,000
nonstock corporations. Of the questions I received that day, though,
the lion's share, to my recollection, related to the nonstock corpora-
tion amendments. Many of those questions related to how the
changes to the nonstock corporation law would affect homeowners'
associations or other nonprofit organizations that would directly affect
the legislator's constituents. On the broad-based stock corporation
law amendments, though, the legislators deferred to the judgment of
the Council and the members of the Delaware State Bar Association.
I think there is a certain level of trust between the legislators and
members of the Delaware Bar. Both camps know how critically im-
portant it is for Delaware's corporation law to be modern, clear, and
responsive to the needs of corporations and their investors.
2. Id. § 145.
3. Id. § 267.
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GREGORY VARALLO: So we've got an up-to-date statute, but,
of course, that doesn't work very well unless you have good judges
interpreting the statute. And we've dealt with that in a couple of
ways. We've got a bench in our Court of Chancery made up of five
business law expert judges.
Those judges, year in and year out for the last ten years, have been
recognized by the United States Chamber of Commerce as the leading
court in the country. And it's an equity court, and it's the only one of
the fifty states-Delaware's the only one of the fifty states that never
merged law and equity. So it's an equity court that traces its jurisdic-
tion directly to the High Court of Chancery in London, and theoreti-
cally, you're supposed to be able to cite English cases to it if you can't
find one from Delaware.
The five chancellors are renowned business law experts, and impor-
tantly, we appoint our judges in a merit selection process rather than
by election. And those judges serve for twelve-year terms subject to
reappointment by the governor. In addition, our constitution requires
a balance between the major parties on the courts. So politics are
effectively removed from the process. You never have more demo-
crats than republicans and vice versa.
As equity jurists, they work without juries. Punitive damages are
not available in equity, so you're not seeing large punitive awards.
And their decisions are directly appealable to one layer of appellate
court, the Delaware Supreme Court. That court has five members,
three of which are former members of the Court of Chancery and are
also very well-esteemed.
So under the leadership of our last chancellor, the administrative
head of the court and a judge as well, but under the leadership of Bill
Chandler, our last chancellor, the court-realizing that it had done
probably pretty much everything it could do to keep its rules and its
processes and its customs up-to-date and usable for the bar for not
only the state but around the country as well-began to look at ADR
as an additional offering that the state might make available to its
constituents.
In its first foray, which continues to operate today, the court offered
a private judicial mediation program. That is to say, by consent, any
two parties, as long as there's some nexus to Delaware-one's either a
Delaware citizen because it's a natural person, or alternatively, a Del-
aware corporation-can determine to have one of the five sitting
members of the court act as mediator.
Now, importantly, there are mediation programs throughout the
court system in the U.S., but typically those mediation programs in-
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volve pending cases in the court. This particular system allows you to
take a pending court case into mediation before a different member of
the court, or alternatively, by agreement, to simply file a mediation-
only case.
There are a number of benefits to this particular mediation pro-
gram. One is that you're dealing with one of the five esteemed mem-
bers of the Court of Chancery. Second, it's entirely private. The
mediation-only docket, for example, is not available on LexisNexis,
and it is simply not something that you can find out about no matter
how hard you push.
And third, having done a large number of these mediations before
the court, there is some inherent value and perhaps a substantial in-
herent value in bringing a client into the court system and allowing
that client to hear an evaluation of its case from a sitting judge, a
judge who is, for this purpose, acting as mediator but nonetheless a
sitting judge.
Clients just tend to listen to jurists a little bit more closely, espe-
cially when the jurist is sitting in the same court that its case will pro-
ceed in, if there is a case, than other mediators. So those are the
pluses.
We've had some minuses along the way, however. Nothing's per-
fect. The skill set that makes a jurist an outstanding jurist may or may
not be a perfect overlap with the skill set that makes a neutral a really
good mediator. And like any group of professionals, we have some
who are better than others at mediation. I think the pluses outweigh
the minuses. There are mediators for sure who are better than our
sitting members in the Court of Chancery, in part because they do it
every single day.
If you look at some of the leading mediators either in this city or,
more broadly, nationally, those men and women make a living doing
nothing but ADR. They study it deeply. They're really, really good at
it. Sitting jurists who also decide cases also can be very good at it, but
don't do it as a steady diet every single day. So there's going to be
some disparity in skill set between full-time mediators and those who
aren't.
Nonetheless, at least in my experience in dealing with a number of
mediations before the court, the value of having the sitting judge act-
ing in an evaluative function is quite high.
But I think Delaware recognized, as we went through our experi-
ence with this mediation program, which is ongoing and extremely
successful, that that wasn't perhaps the be-all, end-all; that perhaps
there were other alternatives that could also be offered to litigants or
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prospective litigants. And so in 2009, the legislature passed a statute
permitting judicially-run private arbitration.
That is to say, just like with JAMS, the ICC, or any other arbitral
body, you could by contract determine and elect to bring a dispute to
the Court of Chancery filed on an arbitration-only separate, private
docket.
As designed, there were a number of-there are a number of really
neat features about this. First of all, once again, it's a sitting judge. So
just as sitting judges sometimes don't make the best mediators, I
would also suggest to you that lawyers who are trained in arbitration
and mediation, while there are many very, very fine ones, sometimes
don't make the best sitting judges either.
And this is a program which I think leverages the particular
strengths of the Court of Chancery, that is to say, making decisions.
Chancery is world-renowned because it's pragmatic, it's practical. It
gets to the bottom of things quickly, and it doesn't typically let cases
sit very long.
Well, our arbitration regime is sort of chancery supercharged. And
the key to it is a rule of the court adopted in early 2010 that says from
the first conference, from the time arbitration is commenced through
to decision, it should in most cases take no more than ninety days.4 So
you're dealing with super-fast track arbitration.
One of the earlier speakers talked about many mediated cases get-
ting to final resolution in two years, and that's a perfectly good esti-
mate for the typical complex case. These cases are getting decided or
were getting decided before they were enjoined in ninety to one hun-
dred twenty days.
We've had six of them. The rules were adopted on January 5, 2010,
and between that point and the injunction, which was in 2011, Dela-
ware processed six of these cases from start to finish. My firm was
counsel in five of them, and I was lucky enough to be counsel in four
of the six.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: I will just interject that we were
at the very first arbitration hearing-I believe it was the second filed,
but it was certainly the first hearing and five minutes or so before the
proceeding was underway, each member of the Delaware Court of
Chancery had been served with a complaint by the Delaware Coali-
tion for Open Government. The chancellor, who was presiding over
our arbitration, let us know.
4. DEL. CH. CT. R. 97(e).
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GREGORY VARALLO: And he wasn't very happy that day, if I
recall.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: That was my recollection as
well.
GREGORY VARALLO: Actually, I happened to participate with
the chancellor in a symposium on Monday in New York City, and he's
still not very happy about that development. In any event, so sort of
the key to this ninety-day fast track, with a sitting judge as your de-
cider, is that it's extremely customizable. There are a series of rules
that say if you don't customize, Rules 26-37 of the Delaware Chan-
cery Court will apply to discovery.5 Rules 26-37 look a lot like the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).6 So if you think about
26-37 of FRCP, you've got effectively how it looks. But the rules pro-
vide that the parties, by agreement, can change any rule and adopt
any procedure they want.
Appeal, which would lie directly to the Delaware Supreme Court
under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)7 and is limited, can be
waived altogether by contract by the parties. There's a separate-as I
mentioned, a separate arbitration-only private docket. And this is for
commercial matters where the damage-potential damages are $1
million or more, where there's a written agreement of the parties and
where one of the parties is a Delaware citizen, which includes obvi-
ously Delaware incorporated entities.
To the extent that the parties are looking for purely equitable relief,
that is to say, an injunction or specific performance and not damages,
those cases don't have to be-they don't have to meet the $1 million
jurisdictional threshold. And in the event that you're looking for a
mixture of equity and ancillary damages, those cases also don't have
to meet the $1 million jurisdictional threshold.
So it's easy to get in. It requires a written agreement by the parties,
and importantly, the way the judges have gone about making this sys-
tem happen has really been to give the parties the maximum flexibility
possible to design how they want the program to look.
If the parties want it to look like an alternative trial with discovery
and depositions and interrogatories and requests for admission, it
looks like one. If the parties want it to look like a pure argument on
an issue of law, it looks like one. Whatever the parties want, the
5. DEL. CH. Or. R. 26-37.
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
7. United States Arbitration Act (known as the Federal Arbitration Act), Pub. L. No. 68-401,
43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006)).
DELAWARE PRIVATE ARBITRATION
courts have been very good about being responsive to allowing us to
craft these too.
I would say as well that as you sort of think about this as an alterna-
tive, and hopefully it will soon be an alternative again. The next
panel, we're going to talk about the constitutionality issues. The Third
Circuit has the appeal, and it's been fully briefed and scheduled for
argument, and we ought to know relatively soon, at least at the circuit
court level, what the answer is. As you think about how this looks, I
can't stress enough that while there are default rules that are availa-
ble, those rules are subject to being customized in any way, shape, or
form.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: To that point, we have included
in the materials for this presentation a form arbitration provision.8 As
you can see, our form is heavily annotated and goes through in signifi-
cant detail all of the elements that can be customized.
There are fifteen or so different footnotes, all of which are very
extensive. Viewing this carefully, it becomes clear that parties can
make the arbitration process operate however they want it to operate,
subject to the baseline default rules that Greg had mentioned. Prior
to the injunction, there were only six arbitration proceedings. In one
of the ones that Greg and I were involved in, the parties did not have
an arbitration agreement in place from the outset.
This particular proceeding involved a dispute that had arisen with
respect to a provision of the certificate of incorporation-it was, in
large part, a dispute over the interpretation of a specific clause.
Rather than proceeding to customary litigation, the parties decided it
was in everyone's interest to submit the matter to arbitration.
The parties agreed that they would focus only on the narrow issue
of contract interpretation. They agreed there would be no discovery.
Everyone recognized that there was no need for scorched-earth litiga-
tion. Rather, it was in everyone's interest to make sure that the dis-
pute remained focused on the single issue at hand. We were able to
do that and do that very effectively.
GREGORY VARALLO: I also want to say I think the other sort of
piece of this that's not in the rules and not written down anywhere,
unless it's written down in our articles on the subject, has been the
ability to pick your arbitrator. The rules contemplate that you'll file a
petition. The petition will go to the head of the court or the chancel-
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lor. The chancellor will assign an arbitrator among one of the five
sitting members of the court.
But what grew up under the mediation ADR regime and was sort of
carried over informally to the arbitration side is that if the parties de-
cide we want vice chancellor so-and-so as opposed to any of the others
and you send a letter to the chancellor with your petition and say,
"Please appoint vice chancellor so-and-so. We've agreed among our-
selves to arbitrate before that member of the court," then you get that
member of the court. At least based upon our initial experience, you
get that member of the court. Same thing on the arbitration side, and
it's a carryover, I think, of the intention to make this as user-friendly
and productive as possible.
So let us switch, if we can, for a couple of minutes to talking about a
number of our experiences. Obviously, these are mostly private, so
we won't use names of clients, but we'll talk about the kinds of dis-
putes we've seen processed through this regime. And then maybe
turn to our form and talk you through some of the issues you should
think about that have come out of this regime and our experiences in
the regime. And hopefully those experiences will be useful to you
whether you're in chancery, JAMS, AAA, or any other regime.
There are just a number of things to think about in crafting what
our luncheon speaker rightly described as being the all-important ar-
bitration agreement. So experiences, starting with the one John Mark
talked about, we had a client that was a substantial private equity fund
that had a dispute with its investee. As you might expect, private eq-
uity funds don't think it's a good idea to be on record as suing their
investees, or then they face the possibility that investees might not
want to take their money in the future.
They had a narrow legal issue about how to interpret a particular
provision in their certificate of incorporation. And when we worked
with them, we said, "Look, you could bring this litigation publicly and
you could spend a lot of money and a lot of time getting to an answer.
But honestly, if we get the other side to agree that we won't sue you,
and in exchange for not suing you, we'll get to a quick, arbitrated reso-
lution before a sitting member of the court, that's really in every-
body's interests."
It's in everybody's interests because (a) we can do it in ninety days,
(b) we can agree what this proceeding will look like, and (c) if we set
it up just so, we won't need to go through a preliminary injunction
phase, which because this was transactionally-based, we would have
done had we litigated.
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JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: The situation I described was
one in which the parties had a good-faith disagreement over the con-
struction of a particular term. The language in question, like the lan-
guage in virtually any document drafted many years ago, with benefit
of hindsight, could have been drafted better.
I don't believe that either party, in this case, thought the other was
venal or acting in bad faith or taking a frivolous position. Both parties
understood that they had their construction of the provision, the other
side had their construction of the provision, and the judge was going
to pick one or the other. Both sides were at an impasse. Neither
could convince the other of its reading. They need a court to settle the
matter.
Had that gone through litigation, it would have taken far longer
than arbitration proceedings ultimately took. In less than sixty days,
the parties had submitted briefing and participated in a hearing before
the chancellor.
GREGORY VARALLO: It would have cost the client five to ten
times what it cost with this regime.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: Easily. As it turns out, we filed
our brief, they filed their brief. There was no discovery. We went
before the chancellor (which, incidentally, was the morning on which
the Delaware Coalition for Open Government filed its complaint).
During that hearing, the parties got a fairly clear indication from the
chancellor how he was approaching the issue. As a result, within a
few days, the parties settled the dispute. The rest is history.
GREGORY VARALLO: And in terms of customizing, again, we
gave up the right to file motions, we gave up the right to appeal, and
we gave up the right to discovery. We just said, "Hey, we need a judge
who can tell us what the legal answer is here."
We trust these judges because they are-they have a well-deserved
reputation. And after filing briefings, just like you would on a motion
for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, we went in and argued
the case without a factual record, just on the law. And as John Mark
said, we effectively had an answer from the bench, and the parties
resolved their differences within about a week.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: Yes, within a week.
GREGORY VARALLO: That's one end of the spectrum that
we've been involved with. The other end of the spectrum looked and
felt much more like a trial. There was a pending case in the Delaware
Court of Chancery, a publicly-filed breach of fiduciary duty case aris-
ing from a private equity firm's financing of an investee company, but
it was public.
4932013]
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And there was, I think, a strong interest on the part of both parties
to get it resolved as quickly as possible. We were the defendants in
the case, and we said to the plaintiffs, "Look, we're willing to convert
this into one of these private arbitrations in chancery. And what you,
the plaintiffs, will get out of it is a resolution in ninety days. Do you
want more? We're willing to waive our right to move for summary
judgment or to dismiss your complaint. So not only do you get a re-
sult in ninety days, but you get a result in ninety days that goes right to
the merits. We're going to go take discovery. We're going to put on a
hearing before the arbitrator just like we would in trial, and we're
going to be done. And, oh, by the way, we want both sides to waive
appeal."
As strange as it sounds, both sides to the matter perceived benefit in
that. And the benefit, the plaintiffs thought they were going to win.
They thought they were going to win money and a lot of it. And the
benefit they perceived in it was getting to a non-appealable resolution
in ninety days and getting their money very soon after ninety days.
From the defendant's perspective, we had limited insurance cover-
age. Frankly, if we had gone to full-blown litigation, it would have
cost us a couple of million dollars to do it, to bring it through full case
and appeal. And the thought was, let's get an answer as soon as possi-
ble, and if we're wrong, there will be some insurance money left over
to help pay the judgment as opposed to exhausting the insurance
money with the lawyers.
That's exactly what we did. It turned out to take about one hun-
dred twenty days rather than ninety, so we simply agreed, and we
went back to the judge and said, "We need another thirty days, judge,
to get this done." The judge was more than happy to do it. We put
hearing witnesses on. We went through about three days, and the
judge called the proceeding and said, "I'm ready to decide. I don't
need to hear from any other witnesses. Verdict for defense."
So we then played around with an interesting question-Under a
new regime, how do you go about making that verdict, entering it on
the docket of the court, and entering it consistent with the need to
keep it but still protecting your client, so that if a frivolous case was
brought later on the same facts, you could claim res judicata
protection?
As it turns out, we found out sort of by stumbling around and fil-
ing-attempting to file a case to enforce the judgment that we didn't
need to do it. The chancellor told us privately that all we needed to
do was go back to the vice chancellor who was our arbitrator and that
that arbitrator would switch hats from arbitrator to vice chancellor of
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the Court of Chancery and sign a piece of paper called a judgment
that could be filed on the docket of the court.
The judgment said, "Judgment for defendants and against plain-
tiffs." That's all it said. It had the caption of the case. It was a one-
liner. He signed it, entered it, and since it was not subject to appeal, it
became final. The other side took its lumps, and we all went home
happy having done it in about one hundred twenty days.
The third and fourth cases, really flipsides of the same case, I think
were a little bit more interesting from the point of view of whether
this kind of dispute resolution works all the time. Because these kinds
of alternative dispute resolutions get triggered by the parties' prior
agreement in writing, we began to put these into merger agreements
thinking that it would be a neat way to resolve things like earn-out
disputes, escrow disputes, or other deal-related disputes.
We also began to put them into public company M&A documents,
and we wound up with a fascinating dispute almost exactly a year ago
where two public companies had agreed to merge, and prior to the
merger closing, prior to the stockholders' vote which led to the merger
closing, the companies realized that there were some issues particu-
larly relating to the target's accounting, and the buyer decided it
didn't want to go forward and claimed a breach of representation and
warranty under the merger agreement pertaining to the target's
accounting.
It gets interesting real quickly when you're both public companies
subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and are required by
federal law to make disclosure of material facts to your stockholders.
Because this particular deal was public on both sides and because the
question of whether the deal would go forward at all was at issue in
the underlying arbitration, both sides thought it was critical that they
disclose the existence of the arbitration, and broadly, without being
very specific, describing broadly what the arbitration was about. Both
sides did that.
My client had a registration statement on Form S-4-and I'm sorry
if I'm boring the non-securities lawyers in the group. But when you
issue stock to do a merger, you need to get it registered under the
Securities Act of 1933, and you do that by filing something called a
registration statement. This particular thing was a registration state-
ment on Form S-4.
That's important for only one reason, and the one reason is a regis-
tration statement, when filed and effective, incorporates by reference
the other side's, the target to the merger agreement's, financial
statements.
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So we were a buyer filing a registration statement to register stock
to issue in connection with this merger, and we had our target's finan-
cial statements in that registration statement. But in the private arbi-
tration, we were taking the view that those financial statements were
false, misleading, and otherwise not in compliance with GAAP.
So a securities lawyer would tell you we were effectively between a
rock and a hard place because under the law, once we filed that regis-
tration statement, our stockholders are presumed to be entitled to rely
on its correctness, including everything incorporated by reference
there.
We could not allow that to happen while at the same time privately
arbitrating the question of whether those very financial statements
were or were not accurate. And we found ourselves grappling with
extraordinarily difficult issues pertaining to how to go about making
disclosures, which were fair to the arbitration process, which has at its
core privacy, and also keeping in compliance with our federal law
obligations.
And I will tell you that the views of the buyer and seller on what
was absolutely required were quite different. Seller took the view that
no disclosure was required. Buyer took the view that it either needed
to withdraw the S-4 or to make disclosure that stockholders were not
permitted to rely on the financial statements in it.
That led to a fairly nasty fight in the arbitration, and the arbitrator,
being a creative guy, came up with a fascinating way to deal with it.
He ordered that my partner, who is a securities lawyer, would be ap-
pointed effectively as a special master of the court and that my client
was not permitted to make any federal disclosure without first
presenting it to my partner, convincing my partner that it was required
and having my partner file an affidavit with the court saying that he
had reviewed the proposed disclosure and concluded that it was re-
quired by law.
Interestingly, we stopped making disclosure. The long and the short
of it was literally on the eve of the arbitration hearing, which was
within ninety days, the parties renegotiated their deal and everybody
was happy and the deal closed.
But it pointed out to us, I think, the limits of private arbitration.
And while there are many kinds of disputes in a public deal where
private arbitration works just fine, I have a question in my own mind
anyway as to whether it works as well where what you're trying to do
is renegotiate or end the deal because of the disclosure overlays.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: I think in a public-public mate-
rial adverse effect (MAE) contest, where you have parties fighting
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over whether the deal should go forward, given the overlay of federal
securities laws and the amount of disclosure that needs to be made, it
does seem to me that the confidentiality component of the arbitration
procedure is almost certain to complicate matters. And that is per-
haps an understatement.
MAE litigation, by its nature, is hard-fought and intense, as well as
fact-sensitive and fact-intensive. In most cases, it is probably benefi-
cial to go through the full-blown discovery process. Personally, I'm
not convinced that the arbitration procedure is ideal for all disputes
under a public-public merger agreement.
I do think, though, that it does have a place in private company
disputes over various types of transactions or contractual disputes.
There is a lot of value in whittling down all of the noise and focusing
on what is really at issue. And the parties can do that before they
have even presented the matter to the court.
Earlier, Greg mentioned escrow disputes. Those disputes have a
tendency to get highly contentious. If you could limit the number and
types of disputes in an arbitration proceeding, the parties could save a
lot of time and effort and reach a far better outcome.
GREGORY VARALLO: I'm eternally hopeful and I hope that in
the future, assuming we are back in business in this area, that we'll be
able to design arbitration parameters that make sense for that neces-
sary public disclosure. Obviously, we're all imperfect, and as we sort
of stumbled through it the first time with a judge doing what he
needed to do in trying to bring some sense and order to it, we had this
very weird hybrid procedure of sort of special master, sort of disciplin-
ing our disclosures as we went.
Maybe not the best possible solution long-term, but it tended to
work in that case, and I have great faith in the ability of creative peo-
ple to come up with creative solutions to difficult problems.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: Again, in private company
mergers, it would be ideal.
GREGORY VARALLO: We just confirmed in the Court of Chan-
cery the largest arbitral award ever given in Delaware. For those of
you of a certain age, you may remember Guitar Hero and Rock Band.
Well, they were, at the time they were published, the most successful
software games ever published. I think since that time, Call of Duty
and Black Ops have sort of leapfrogged over them, but when Guitar
Hero and Rock Band came out, they were the biggest selling software
games ever.
There was a company called Harmonix that owned those software
games, created those games, and sold to Viacom. Obviously,
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Viacom's in the entertainment business. And just like every single
movie dispute where the movie makes a billion dollars and the talent
who has a piece of the movie is told that the movie lost money, sur-
prisingly, Viacom concluded that Guitar Hero and Rock Band lost
money. So the parties had an earn-out on the backside of the deal.
Viacom concluded after originally paying out $150 million, very
publicly concluded that it was wrong, and it wanted its $150 million
back. So they sued all 110 stockholders in Delaware, which was kind
of fun, and we then proceeded to effectively arbitrate before so-called
resolution accountants the amount of this escrow, and the resolution
accountants concluded about three months ago that not only did
Viacom not get its $150 million back but also, in fact, it owed an addi-
tional $350 million.
And that was brought to the chancery court for confirmation of
judgment. The chancellor confirmed the judgment, and we're before
the Delaware Supreme Court on the narrow FAA issues on whether
the chancellor effectively fell off the turnip truck or not. As the pro-
ponent of that award, I daresay I believe that the Delaware Supreme
Court will affirm with all due haste the chancellor's most excellent
opinion.
So as we went through these four or five original arbitrations in
Delaware, we sort of came to the conclusion that the system, while it
was very well-designed, wasn't perfect. And so we began thinking
about how we could make it better and published an article9 not too
long before the darn thing was enjoined putting a form out there and
saying, "Look, here are the things we found that could, in fact, be
better." That form is in your materials, and I'll yield to John Mark to
walk you through this.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: This goes to one of the points
that one of the speakers earlier had made. I am principally a corpo-
rate advisory attorney. Greg is a corporate advisory attorney, and he
is also a litigator and a very fine one at that. But he and I did actually
work together on this.
I started off with a basic form arbitration provision that I'd used in
other agreements. Greg then went through it, based on his experience
and his knowledge of the rules, and he added in various places the
ways in which parties could modify the provisions by reference to the
rules. He also added a few elements to address the typical traps-for-
9. Greg Varallo et al., Chancery Arbitrations After Year One: Annotated New Form, AM. BAR
Ass'N (Aug. 16, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/commercial/articles/
summer20l2-0812-chancery-arbitrations-annotated-new-form.html.
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the-unwary circumstance. He highlighted those situations to ensure
that parties were focused on them-such that they would not go unde-
tected or unconsidered.
In annotating the form, we attempted to explain what we were do-
ing in the text of the provision and why we were doing it, making
reference to the rules on which the provisions were based. The form
starts of within a basic agreement to arbitrate. In this case, obviously
the parties would agree to arbitrate pursuant to the arbitration law
and rules that have now been declared unconstitutional, at least for
the moment.
GREGORY VARALLO: Let me just jump in here for a second.
We're going to go back and forth as we go. I just finished negotiating
a month-long-literally it took us a month to negotiate an arbitration
agreement, and the guts of that arbitration agreement we took the
month to get to was defining precisely the issues that were going to be
arbitrated.
The professor mentioned that as a way to save money, and I
couldn't agree more. I think there's almost nothing more important
than getting both sides' minds around what it is that actually is going
to be arbitrated. It literally took us a month to come to that conclu-
sion, to write it down, and to agree on the words. It was complicated,
but it shouldn't have taken a month. It did.
Obviously this first paragraph doesn't go into the specific issues that
are going to be arbitrated.10 Like any form, you need to work with
this and expand or contract it as appropriate for your client. But don't
miss the idea here of identifying precisely what it is you're arbitrating
about and dumping it in here.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: This form-obviously it con-
templates that it would be part of an agreement, and it's a very broad
arbitration provision." The parties could narrow this in scope. For
example, if this were included in a merger agreement and if the parties
didn't want it to apply to every element of the merger agreement, but
rather only to the escrow provision or to whether or not a particular
condition has been satisfied, the parties would have the flexibility to
do that. Because this is a form, it refers to any dispute or controversy
arising out of the agreement and the transactions contemplated
thereby.
10. Form of Arbitration Provision, supra note 8, at 1.
11. Id.
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Another feature of the first clause is that the parties agree not to
object to the submission of the dispute to arbitration.12 It is very im-
portant to make sure that the parties irrevocably waive that objection
to the fullest extent permitted by law. Once the parties are in arbitra-
tion, there's no backing out.
Moving to the next provision, the form gets into the rules and how
they will be applied.' 3 This form starts from the premise that the arbi-
tration is going to be "conducted in accordance with the Chancery
Rules pertaining to arbitration, [except that the parties agree that
Rule 97(f) of the Chancery Rules shall not be argued or construed to
abridge the right of any party to take discovery pursuant to Rules 26
through 37 . ... "14 Greg, do you want to translate that into English?
GREGORY VARALLO: Yeah. In plain English, Rule 97(f) gives
the arbitrator the right to limit or condition discovery in the arbitra-
tor's judgment.'5 We had a matter where the parties had not agreed
to limit the number of depositions looking forward to a final arbitra-
tion hearing.
The arbitrator took the view, the chancellor took the view that Rule
97(f) gave him the ability to put a limit on the total number of deposi-
tions that were used by the parties, and he did put such a limit on it.
By taking Rule 97(f) out of here, assuming you're using the Chancery
Rules, you're giving yourself the right to say, "We're going to take as
many depositions as we need to, gosh darn it."
However, if you are focused on a matter in which you need to con-
trol costs, certainly one of the things you might want to think about is
instead of going this direction, say, "No, instead, we're going to have
three depositions a side or five depositions a side, whatever you de-
cide to do." But this is designed expressly to take away from the arbi-
trator the power to tell you how many depositions you will take.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: Next, the form provides that ar-
bitration shall take place in Wilmington, Delaware.16 Greg, is there
any particular reason we selected Wilmington?
GREGORY VARALLO: I prefer Paris myself. The problem with
Paris is that the judges who are arbitrators are public servants and
they have busy calendars in Wilmington, and as much as they'd like to
go off to some exotic, foreign locale, they can't.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1-2.
14. Id. at 1.
15. DEL. CH. CT. R. 97(f).
16. Form of Arbitration Provision, supra note 8, at 2.
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JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: If we were talking about one of
the vice chancellors in the lower counties of Delaware, we may not be
able to get our blessing in that provision or our request in that
provision.
GREGORY VARALLO: I think for purposes of our contract, we
would say this, and then to the extent we had Sam Glasscock or one of
the downstate vice chancellors, we would simply agree to move the
locale to a place convenient to the arbitrator.
You don't need to know this, but Delaware's a small, little state.
It's only a couple miles wide, but it's about 110 miles long. And at the
very bottom of that 110 miles is a place called Georgetown, Delaware,
which is the county seat of one of the three counties.
Wilmington's about as far from Georgetown as you can go in Dela-
ware, and so asking-if you wind up with that judge as arbitrator, ask-
ing him to come to Wilmington for what could be a week-long hearing
is a little bit of an imposition on him, and we would typically go down
and visit with him and spend some time with the good citizens of
Georgetown.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: The following clause provides
that the arbitration shall be presided over by an arbitrator who shall
be a chancellor or one of the vice chancellors.17
GREGORY VARALLO: Let me interrupt there one second. The
statute and rules contemplate also that the chancellor could appoint a
master in chancery as an arbitrator. In our view, the benefit of this
regime is getting one of the five rock star sitting judges as opposed to
one of the two non-rock star junior judges called masters in chancery.
So we don't include master in chancery here.
With all due respect to the masters, 'they're both doing a great job
and they are junior rock stars. They'll one day be full-fledged rock
stars. I know we're on the record, so I want to make that apology. Go
ahead.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: The next provision provides
that any issue over whether, or the extent to which, the dispute is sub-
ject to arbitration shall itself be decided exclusively by the arbitrator.18
Even though it seems relatively innocuous, this is actually a fairly im-
portant clause. Whether or not whatever the parties are submitting
before the arbitrator is subject to arbitration should be a matter for
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GREGORY VARALLO: And this is-when you get into arbitra-
tion, you spend some time learning the area. There's a difference be-
tween substantive arbitrability and procedural arbitrability-I have a
hard time with that word-in the law. And state-by-state, the law dif-
fers as to who gets to decide which of those issues.
The Delaware law on this particular issue is extremely complicated,
and frankly, less than a model of clarity. And the purpose of saying
that the arbitrator gets to decide what is arbitrable serves an impor-
tant substantive purpose of making sure that your arbitrator is decid-
ing all issues and nobody has a right to run to court to decide whether
something is or isn't within the scope of the arbitration.
Of course, in this particular case, if the arbitrator is a sitting mem-
ber of the court, you could conceive of him or her simply changing
hats and putting their judge hat on to make the decision. But for pur-
poses of clarity, we wanted this in here, and it's important if you're
under Delaware law, that if you want the arbitrator to decide what is
arbitrable, that you expressly say so in your contract.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: Next we go to something that
we've been talking a lot about, and that really is that the arbitral
award shall be rendered within ninety days after the request for arbi-
tration is submitted.19
Now, recognizing, as you indicated earlier, this is aspirational from
the get-go. Our experience so far has suggested that it is not only
possible but also likely that the parties can complete the process in
ninety days or less. Perhaps that will have to get kicked out in some
cases to one hundred twenty days.
But, for the right type of dispute, the process can be concluded very
quickly. The chancellor and the vice chancellors are incredibly re-
sponsive. It's unlike any other place that I'm aware of. There is an
enormous benefit to the Delaware court system, and I think this
clause (e) that sets forth the timetable in which the parties are antici-
pating resolving the dispute is one of the most important features of
the entire regime.20
Next, the clause includes numerous provisions dealing with how the
award will be rendered: whether it's going to be a written award and
whether the parties would like to have the chancellor or the vice chan-
cellor articulate the basis for the ruling. 21 In some cases, the chancel-
19. Id. at 2-3.
20. Id.
21. Form of Arbitration Provision, supra note 8, at 2-3.
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lor or vice chancellor could rule from the bench. In other cases, the
parties may want to see the reasoning in a written opinion.
It's really a matter of how the parties want to proceed and intend to
address subsequent matters. Greg, do you want to address the cir-
cumstances under which the parties would want to have the order re-
flected in writing, along with the reasoning?
GREGORY VARALLO: Sure. I think there are two circum-
stances. One is if you want to make the award appealable. That is to
say, if you don't want to waive your right to appeal, it usually is useful
to have some statement of reasoning to be able to argue on appeal in
case you've lost.
The other reason you would do it, I think our luncheon speaker
referred to the idea that sometimes clients need to say their piece and
be heard and sometimes clients need to have a judicial officer or an
arbitrator or a neutral make a ruling on whether they're right or not,
and if they aren't right, why aren't they right.
I think the more you do of this, both in litigation and in alternative
dispute resolution, the more you come to the conclusion that about
three-quarters of what we do is cathartic, psychologically cathartic,
that is to say, giving people their so-called day in court, their opportu-
nity to express their views. And I think if you sense you have a client
who needs not only to know what the answer is but why, you would
put a provision in here asking for written reasons.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: As you mentioned, if the par-
ties preserve the right to appeal, they will almost need to have some-
thing in the agreement that requires or attempts to require some type
of written opinion.
And that leads to the next provision: whether or not the parties will
have the right to appeal. 22 This is one of the most important decisions
that the parties will need to make at the outset. If the parties go in
with the idea that this is going to be just one shot, where they'll put
their best foot forward, they've got to be willing to live with the conse-
quences of that decision. Because when it's done, it truly is done.
GREGORY VARALLO: I would say that actually in this chancery
regime, it has been an easier sell than I thought it would be to sell the
idea of waiving appeal. And I think good counselors-and I'm assum-
ing that you know the law when you're counseling here-start by ex-
plaining to their clients that an appeal from an arbitrable award would
proceed pursuant to the statute that this is all arising under, the FAA.
And under the FAA, as you all know, there are very narrow grounds
22. Id. at 3.
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for appeal. There are grounds for appeal, but they're exceedingly
narrow.
I don't have it in front of me, but there's one prong of the federal
appeals-FAA appeals standard that effectively they so misconstrued
the law that you couldn't possibly be right, my version of it. But it's
very, very hard to prevail on an appeal under the FAA on application
of the law, so long as some version of applicable law was actually
applied.
So I think you start by explaining to your client that while you do
have appellate rights, they're narrow, and they are effectively the es-
cape valve, the pressure valve for the entirely inappropriate, entirely
wildly wrong arbitration result-the wholly unexpected result.
If you're in the Court of Chancery arbitrating, you, by definition,
unless the chancellor has some serious problem, you, by definition, are
not ever going to get the wildly wrong result, never going to get the
result that would give you grounds for appeal effectively. Not to say
you won't appeal, but not likely on good grounds under the FAA.
So at least from my point of view in counseling clients through this,
waiving your right to appeal is a relatively small give if you're being
asked to give it. And if you are on the fence as to whether to do an
arbitration and timing matters to you, even fast appeals in the Dela-
ware Supreme Court take about three to six months.
They commit to the public that they'll process an appeal within
ninety days of the date it is finally submitted either on briefing or
argument, but the typical brief schedule is thirty, thirty, thirty, so
you're about one hundred eighty days in the typical appeal. There are
plenty of matters where clients value final, non-appealable decisions
within ninety days over the theoretical possibility that the chancellor
totally loses it and commits error that is so gross that it is overturnable
and appealable under the FAA.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: Next, the form provides broad
authority to the arbitrator to grant any equitable or legal remedy, ex-
cluding punitive or exemplary damages that would be available in a
judicial proceeding including entering injunctive relief.2 3 There are a
couple of issues to note here. One, the form excludes punitive dam-
ages because they are not available in the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery. Next, the form provides that the arbitrator has the ability to
enter injunctive relief. Greg, could you limit injunctive relief in the




GREGORY VARALLO: I think you've got a constitutional issue
on punitive damages because while the chancellors are sitting as arbi-
trators, chancery is not authorized, equity is not authorized to grant
punitive damages by constitution. And on-I'm sorry, what was the
second question?
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: The second question is whether
you could limit, or request that the court limit injunctive relief and just
focus on, let's say, damages.
GREGORY VARALLO: I think it's certainly possible to ask the
court to limit the remedies that he or she grants as arbitrator. My
experience with that outside of arbitration has not been very good,
and typically what I mean is if you're doing a simple contract and the
contract says parties waive any requirement for posting of a bond and
harm's going to be irreparable in this particular deal if it's breached
and, oh, by the way, the court should grant specific performance to
remedy the irreparable harm if this happens.
You know, the court looks at that, and says, "Oh, thank you very
much, that's all very interesting. But I'm an independent judicial of-
ficer, and I've got to determine that there's a record, and I've got to
determine that there is, in fact, irreparable harm and the basis on
which to grant the relief you want." So even though you might stipu-
late to it by contract, at least in a Delaware equity court, it is not
uniformly granted simply because you stipulated to it.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: Which, of course, is why the en-
forceability opinions contain carve-outs for that.
GREGORY VARALLO: So you've had securities law and you've
had opinion granting here. Could it be any sexier? Could it be any
better?
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: Nothing but glamour from the
guys in Delaware. Next, the form proceeds to its most controversial
provision, the confidentiality clause.24 This form does provide that the
parties agree that, subject to any non-waivable disclosure obligations
under federal law, all will be confidential.
And that was, up until this was enjoined, one of the real benefits of
this regime. The parties could proceed on a confidential basis and
have their dispute resolved quickly and quietly, outside of the view of
the paparazzi. A lot of parties don't like to have their dispute made
public for a variety of reasons. Perhaps they are high-profile people
who don't necessarily want to have their disputes made known to the
entire world.
24. Id. at 4.
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GREGORY VARALLO: Let me articulate that a little bit more
finely. One of the things we do in Delaware is litigate broken deals
when they break or are about to break. And John Mark mentioned
earlier the so-called MAE or the material adverse change clause.
That's right up there with securities law and opinions.
But basically what it means is, I'm buying your company. We're
both public companies and something's happened that's so bad that
you're now a different company. I want to be relieved of my contrac-
tual obligation to buy you. So you're in contract, this happens, and
you decide you're going to go and litigate it. Well, when you're litigat-
ing it in public, you're making a public record of the company you are
about to buy being so badly broken that you don't want to buy it any-
more. If you lose that case and you are enjoined to close the deal,
which has happened-the Tyson Foods case resulted in an injunction
requiring close when the buyer tried to back out. The market has-
you know, all those analysts that set stock price and affect how your
price trades, the market knows that you have just bought something
that you think has serious financial problems associated with it, in fact,
so serious that you wanted to walk away from the deal. Guess what
that's going to do to your stock in the market when that comes
together?
And so from the point of view of public company deal litigation,
this was perceived, at least at first, as a very attractive alternative be-
cause to the extent you have to argue that your target's accounting,
for example, is not only violative of GAAP but perhaps even fraudu-
lent and needs to be restated, it would be kind of nice to do that in a
way that doesn't make a record.
Because if you are forced to continue anyway, guess whose account-
ing is now going to get restated when you merge that company into
you? It's probably going to cause a restatement. Whether or not the
Securities and Exchange Commission looks to the chancellor's deci-
sion, if the Securities and Exchange Commission decides that you
were close enough to being right about the accounting of the target,
that now your accounting is tainted, that's a real mess.
So there are lots of times-now, I know I said earlier that it's very
difficult to manage your public disclosure obligations with the goal of
keeping these private, but to the extent you're doing busted-deal liti-
gation, there certainly is a very big plus on the side of doing it pri-
vately if you possibly can.
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JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: Next, the form goes to the issue
of fees.25 In this form, each party bears its own legal fees and costs.
That's generally consistent with the American rule, except the form
states that each party pays one half of filing fees, and fees and ex-
penses of the arbitrator.
Greg, do you want to talk about how the court's fees were struc-
tured for the arbitration regime generally and whether this was a situ-
ation where the court was using a lot of state resources to establish
and operate this new process and regime?
GREGORY VARALLO: The fee structure actually was substan-
tial. The initial filing fee, I believe, was $12,000 to start one of these
things split between the parties. And each day of hearing or other
judicial activity or arbitrator activity, I think, was $6,000.
The judges varied a little as to when they imposed that additional
$6,000. One of them charged you the $6,000 for every motion,
whether it took half of a day or half of an hour. One of them only
charged the $6,000 for the actual hearing of the arbitration itself. So
there wasn't perfect uniformity about how they were doing that.
That's something that obviously will get ironed out as we have more
experience in this.
But in my experience, these typically wound up costing between
$25,000 and $30,000 all in for the arbitration fee. I'm not talking
about your fees. I'm talking about the fees you paid to the state. If
you do some quick math, we had six of them at $30,000 apiece. That
roughly paid for one of the chancellor's entire year. So this is not an
insubstantial additional revenue generator for the state.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: Next, the form includes an ac-
knowledgment from the parties that the arbitrator may impose rules
different from or in addition to those set forth in this section and that
nothing shall be construed to limit or restrict the arbitrator's power to
impose such rules. 26
The bracketed clause states that, with respect to some of the rules,
the parties really don't want the arbitrator to vary them. 27 That one
may have an aspirational element to it. But, in most cases, if the par-
ties are reasonable, I would venture to say that the arbitrator would
follow suit. To the extent the parties get out of hand and try to tie the
arbitrator's hands, that may not go over so well.
25. Id.
26. Form of Arbitration Provision, supra note 8, at 4-5.
27. Id.
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GREGORY VARALLO: I think that's good advice. I will say,
though, that the first full-blown one of these that was not a truncated
one that actually went to final hearing, the vice chancellor acting as
arbitrator on the first conference said, "Look, folks, I view this as the
ultimate in customizable jurisprudence. So whatever you want to do,
as long as it's consistent with law and good taste, I'll let you do. As
long as both sides agree, whatever you say the rules are for how this is
going to run, I'll run it that way," and he was true to his word. He did
exactly that.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: I think that's right. I think it's
customizable within bounds of ordinary reasonableness and
rationality.
GREGORY VARALLO: Let me focus on one other point of this
provision, and you can tell who the litigator and who the corporate
guy is because he went right past the rules.
In the second paragraph, John Mark, this is section (b) on the first
page, the parties expressly opt into Rules 15, 41, and 45.28 Once
again, we parallel the FRCP. So those of you who are quick will real-
ize that's Rule 15 (amendments), Rule 41 (dismissal), and Rule 45
(subpoenas, third-party discovery).29
What we found in one of these cases was we sought to have the
arbitrator issue subpoenas to third parties who weren't parties to the
arbitration. Frankly, we wanted to take the outside accountants in a
case involving accounting. And the arbitrator took the view-one of
the members of the court took the view, which I thought was very
interesting, that third-party discovery by its nature was in contraven-
tion of the overriding privacy that is in the act and in the rules.
And it would be impossible to issue a subpoena to a third party to
give discovery without telling them, for example, why the subpoena
was coming, in what case it was pending, what the names of the parties
were, and thus disclosing, for example, the fact that there was a dis-
pute between petitioner and respondent.
So the chancellor, acting as arbitrator, declined to issue a subpoena,
and we lived with it. I mean, we dealt with that, but we learned from
it. And in cases where you believe, at least in chancery, that it's neces-
sary to-it's going to be necessary to talk to third parties, investment
bankers, accountants, auditors, that sort of thing, it would be wise, at
least in my view, to include a Rule 45 reference so that the arbitrator
28. Id. at 1.
29. Compare DEL. CH. CT. R. 15, 41, 45, with FED. R. Civ. P. 15, 41, 45.
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understands that the parties contracted for and contemplated the abil-
ity to subpoena third parties.
Rule 15. Interestingly, the way the rules are set up, there's no pro-
vision for amendment. There's a petition, there's a response, and then
you just go. Now, typically where you're going from start to finish in
ninety days, there's not going to be a lot of room for amendment. On
the other hand, if you get quickly into the matter and find out that you
want to somewhat change or redirect the focus of your main claims,
not having an ability to amend could put you in a situation where, at
final hearing, the other side stands up and says, "This is all very nice,
but we weren't put on notice of it in the initial claim and we want the
opportunity to postpone or we want it barred" or whatever relief they
would want.
And so we, again, sort of stumbled into this, but we realized as our
theories changed ever so slightly that we ran the risk of being told that
we hadn't given fair notice to the other side of what our claims were
and therefore having our new theories barred. So we thought it was
wise to include Rule 15 allowing amendment.
And finally Rule 41, to dismiss in the event that for whatever reason
one party or another wants to dismiss short of the final hearing with or
without consent of the other party. Again, they parallel the federal
rules. So if you think of the federal rules, you'll sort of see what we're
talking about.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: The next provision deals with
collateral attacks. 30 Greg, you alluded to these earlier. Do you want
to provide more color on how that provision came into existence and
why we suggested including it in our form?
GREGORY VARALLO: So those of you in civil procedure class or
who have had civil procedure class understand that there's a doctrine
called res judicata, a doctrine called collateral estoppel, and I'm never
quite sure what the difference is between them, which is my lack of
proper upbringing.
But at the end of the day, after you've litigated a matter to final
judgment, you're supposed to not have to litigate the same matter
again, right? Because you get a judgment. And when somebody sues
you on the same facts and theories and/or facts and theories that could
have been litigated in your original case, you plead bar by judgment,
res judicata, collateral estoppel. You file the judgment, and hopefully
the second court dismisses the case and you get the value of your judg-
ment. You get the benefit of your judgment.
30. Form of Arbitration Provision, supra note 8, at 5.
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The problem is when you've got a private arbitration regime and it's
private from start to finish. If there are facts or circumstances that are
necessary to establish the bar of res judicata, at least as between the
parties to the arbitration, and there's no judgment on file that says
those facts and circumstances, that doesn't lay it out anywhere, assum-
ing for purposes of argument, your counterparty acts poorly and
brings a new claim claiming exactly the same things it just lost in pri-
vate arbitration, in a public court, how do you convince the public
court consistent with your undertaking of confidentiality that this has
already been effectively arbitrated and that res judicata should apply?
And so we crafted (i)31 when we were sort of thinking through how
to protect our client that we had just won the arbitration for when we
didn't have clear rules on point. We crafted (i) as an opportunity such
that if the other side brought a subsequent litigation which they
shouldn't have brought, you were relieved of your confidentiality obli-
gations to the extent necessary to make the second court aware of
what was, in fact, arbitrated and so as to allow you to plead res judi-
cata, collateral estoppel.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: The next two provisions are the
provisions that I would refer to as the "thank God we thought of this
when we did" provisions. As an aside, I had included a form along
these lines in an agreement that was entered into shortly before the
entire regime was declared unconstitutional. Clause (j) is basically a
savings clause that would have provided that, if any provision of sec-
tion 349 was found to be invalid on the confidentiality grounds or if
any other confidentiality restriction would have rendered the whole
thing invalid, then that would have been severed from the agree-
ment.32 Clause (k) was basically that if the court ceased to conduct
arbitration proceedings pursuant to section 34933-I guess it didn't
cease so much as ...
GREGORY VARALLO: It was just enjoined.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: It was enjoined, but nonethe-
less, I'm going to read ceased to mean enjoined. That basically pro-
vides an alternate method to have the suit arbitrated or have the case
arbitrated.
In retrospect, we were very fortunate to have included these savings
clauses. A good piece of foresight on our part, although I'd far prefer
that the regime were still in effect.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 6.
DELAWARE PRIVATE ARBITRATION
GREGORY VARALLO: So by way of news from the front, as I
mentioned, we just signed up an arbitration agreement within the last
week or so. It was an agreement-it involves some very well-known
parties who didn't want to publicly litigate, but who were heading to-
wards public litigation.
And the same dynamic. We agreed to non-appealable, ninety-day
arbitration. We effectively copied what a chancery arbitration looked
like, and what we agreed, because we couldn't use a sitting member of
the Court of Chancery. We're blessed in Delaware with two recently
ex-members of the Court of Chancery. They both retired in the last
two years.
We agreed to use an ex-member of the Court of Chancery on the
theory that they were both au courant with the Delaware law and
were responsible jurists who would behave as though-almost as good
as a sitting member of the court.
So what we're doing today is we are trying to replicate this regime
as closely as we can using former judges. But we'd very much like to
be in a position to get back to using the sitting judges if the injunction
is lifted.
Questions? Let's talk. We have a few minutes. Do any of you have
questions about how this works, how it might be better, what worked
for us, what didn't work for us, how to make your regimes better in
AAA or chancery?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Kind of a policy consideration using
judges as arbitrators. In regards to what we've talked a lot today
about how the trial court system is failing companies because of its
inefficiencies and inability to resolve things in a timely manner and
mitigate, I guess, the financial impact of certain judgments. But to
what degree are we just contributing to the problem more by taking
judges away from their traditional roles and using them in an arbitra-
tion system that's primarily been relied upon because of the inefficien-
cies in traditional litigation?
GREGORY VARALLO: Do you practice in Cook County?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I'm a third-year law student, but yeah.
GREGORY VARALLO: So we live in a different world. We're the
Liechtenstein of America. It is an entirely different system in Dela-
ware than literally anywhere else in the country, and I've had the good
fortune to try cases in Massachusetts and Arizona. I've argued to
Judge Aspen out here a number of years back. And I've just had the
opportunity to see the inside of courtrooms all over the country.
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There's nowhere like Delaware. These five judges are incredibly
hard-working, very civic-minded individuals. And in my thirty years
at the bar, the court has grown from three to five judges as the volume
of cases has grown. They are all very busy. They turn out long
opinions.
But unlike elsewhere in the country, most of the work chancery
does is in the context of expedited deal litigation where you need an
answer four or five days after, sometimes two or three days after, it's
presented to the court. And these are judges who deal after deal after
deal will turn out forty-, fifty-, and seventy-five-page opinions within a
day or two of the matter having been argued.
They don't have the typical criminal or family law or auto accident
cases on their docket. Because they are a specialized equity court,
they only hear matters assigned to them by statute or which tradition-
ally have been matters heard in equity.
So if you want equitable relief like an injunction or specific per-
formance, you can go to the Court of Chancery. So it's a court of
limited jurisdiction to begin with. While they are quite busy and while
they work intensely hard, our experience with the first group of these
arbitrations to move through the court was that you couldn't tell any
difference in the output. There certainly was no delay in matters.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: I think the other thing to keep
in mind, too, is that these are matters that would have otherwise just
been filed as cases in chancery and would have taken up probably
more of the court's time as actual cases filed in chancery.
GREGORY VARALLO: And I think the other thing you see is
we've got this really unique working balance between the judiciary,
the bar, and the legislature that we reflected, I think, in talking about
the amendment process for our legislation.
But when it is necessary to authorize a new judge for the court-
and it's happened twice during my career-the bar goes to the legisla-
ture with the chief justice's approval and says, "Hey, we need another
chancellor and here's why: the average caseload has gone from here to
here," so forth and so on. To the extent that these kinds of matters
became more active and took some number of judges out of the pool
who were otherwise available to do the litigations, putting aside the
point John Mark made which is they would be litigating anyways, to
the extent that happens, the Delaware response is very, very clear.
We'll just add another member to the Court of Chancery.
Remember these are generating between $25,000 and $40,000 per
filing, and so from a state revenue point of view, we're going to be
more than able to keep up with the cost from a state budget point of
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view of additional judges. And it's very hard to-I grew up outside of
Delaware. I wasn't born there. I went to school in Philly, and I came
to Delaware. It was this cute little place.
And it took me a number of years to really get it, you know. But in
a small state where 25% of your entire revenue base is the legal indus-
try, broadly defined to include the courts and what they do and the
law firms. With that impact on your bottom line and with both the
legislature and the executive focused on that being the impact on the
bottom line, the state does whatever is necessary to avoid disrupting
that balance.
And so in other states where it might take you three years and lots
of lobbying to get a new judge or a new group of judges, honestly, in
Delaware, when we need it, we go explain it, we figure out how to
fund it, and we get it done. It's that simple.
Because if it was perceived that a regime like this was taking away
from the ability of these judges to meet our public's demand for high
quality jurisprudence in a very prompt fashion, that would eat into our
franchise. And anything that eats into our franchise is immediately
dealt with. It really is an incredibly impressive system, especially from
an outsider's point of view.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Another question. Do the chancellors
have their full resources, their staff, their clerks?
GREGORY VARALLO: They do.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: They're public employees. Do they have
to sign confidentiality agreements?
GREGORY VARALLO: No, they don't sign any agreements. But
since the statute makes these, by definition, confidential, they would
be violating the law if they weren't keeping them entirely confidential.
And these are folks who deal with the most important business is-
sues day-in, day-out that have a huge impact on trading markets. So
it's a court, including its employees, who are highly attuned to the
need to be ultra-careful about confidentiality. There was a question
over here?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I was going to ask you to talk about the
unique things in Delaware that make the system work. Do you think,
then, that this system would not necessarily be viable in other states
because they don't have that same commitment?
GREGORY VARALLO: I got a great story on this. One of my
dear friends was Chairman of the California Corporation Law Revi-
sion Commission, which was the bar's-I think it was the state bar's
system of trying to keep the California Corporation Code up-to-date.
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So it was her job to take-sort of do what John Mark explained
earlier-input from clients and lawyers and prepare a bill and bring it
down to the legislature and explain to the legislature why it was neces-
sary and why it was good for California to make this or that change.
Like I said, for more than one hundred years, when those bills go
down to Dover, the state capital of Delaware, they get passed verba-
tim. And she called me, and we talked through some of the issues that
she was dealing with because she was trying to make California in-line
with Delaware on an important technical point, which long ago es-
caped me, but it was important at the time.
And we talked a lot about it, and she sent me the memo she was
preparing for the legislature, and she was going to go give testimony
and all that good stuff. About six months later, I saw her at an ABA
function and said, "How did that bill go, did you ever get the bill
passed?" And she said, "You know, it almost brought me to tears." I
said, "What's wrong?" She said, "Well, it went into the legislature as
planned, and we put the memo in, and somebody decided to attach a
rider on it prohibiting abortions in California." Honest-to-God truth.
Well, of course it died immediately, and that was the end of the
corporation law bill. And with all due deference to the legislators and
the legislatures, it is their domain to do that sort of thing if they want
to do that sort of thing. What distinguishes Delaware is this unwritten
understanding that the legislature is going to act in a way as partners
with the bar and the bench to make sure that the product we're selling
to the rest of the world-and we are selling it to the world, it's not just
the U.S. corporate law, but it's used around the world-is leading
edge, state of the art, and designed in a way to be the most user
friendly, most usable possible.
And when we stop doing that, we're going to lose up to a quarter of
our revenue, and that would be really bad. California's revenue base
is not nearly so dependent upon the ability of their corporate lawyers
to do corporate law. You know, it's uniquely a small state solution
because everybody knows everybody and you get the message out and
it works. Not that you couldn't do it in a big state, but there are lots of
social issues that wind up getting in the way of getting technical stuff
done in many states.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, in terms of arbitration from the law-
yer's perspective, I was wondering how this affects the nature of your
practice in terms of the pace of the work that you have to do, the
quality and volume you have to accomplish in a short amount of time
and even your bottom line, your revenue stream because you're not
involved in protracted litigation.
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GREGORY VARALLO: Yeah, wonderful question. One of the
things that we do in Delaware as a steady diet is preliminary injunc-
tion and TRO applications to stop deals or to allow deals to go
through if you're on the defense side.
And those tend to be drop everything, spend three or four weeks
intensely focused on one project and only one project, and our firm is
sort of built to be able to accomplish that where a couple of lawyers
can just step out of everything they're doing and other lawyers step in
and help run their other cases while they're off doing preliminary in-
junction work.
This is an expanded version of that. This is, instead of being three
to four weeks, this is three to four months. And they are clearly very
difficult to do because to get a whole case presented in ninety days,
especially where you have to potentially travel to depositions and
such-I will say the last one I did, I was in Taiwan for a week. I was
in-we had Korea come to Taiwan, but we had a number of Asian
depositions. And, you know, just getting from here to California and
California to Asia and doing all that ate up several weeks of the ninety
days, and it was exceedingly difficult to do.
On the other hand, we charge premium rates to do it. And if a
client is fighting in one of these fights, they understand that while
they're going to get a big bill, the bill is always, by definition, going to
be smaller than if it took a year to present the same matter.
The work expands to meet the volume, right? So if you've got a
year, you're going to do a year's work. And I'm not suggesting any-
thing but entirely appropriate ethical representation. It's just that if
you have a year to think about something, you tend to do more work
rather than less.
If you have ninety days to prepare it, you're going to work every
single one of those ninety days, seven days a week. But you can only
go so many hours in ninety days, and my guess is that you will bill
substantially less to the client ultimately.
So the good news is you can send out a big bill because you've got a
big team working for ninety days. The bad news is it kicks the heck
out of your regular practice, and you need partners to be able to cover
that. And the good news for the client is that they wind up overall
paying less than they would if this were a more leisurely litigation.
Does that answer your question?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.
SAM FAYE: Kind of particular to the previous six arbitrations you
did in the program, but was there any fear that pending the enjoinder
a party who had been involved in the private arbitration proceedings
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would try and have a past decision thrown out because the process
itself was unconstitutional?
GREGORY VARALLO: Yes, there was such a fear. I'm not sure
I'm at liberty to talk deeply about it. As it turns out, the plaintiff
pointed to one of these arbitrations that was ongoing during the in-
junction proceedings in federal court, but I don't think he asked for
retroactive opening of the record.
I think what he wanted was an opening of these proceedings on a
going-forward basis on the theory that if you went forward, you would
have fair warning that it was no longer private as opposed to having to
take on the interests of the various companies that were arbitrating
with not only the expectation, but the expectation under a validly
passed statute of a sovereign state that this was, in fact, a private
matter.
So I think the plaintiff-I'll give him credit as my former colleague,
long since departed. But I will give him credit for making an interest-
ing tactical decision not to try to reopen everything that had already
been done.
In the next panel, when we talk about constitutionality, I'll also
point out, though, that the judge issued an injunction that she wasn't
asked to issue. She was asked to make this open to the public going
forward rather than striking down the statute or enjoining them alto-
gether. Nobody asked her to issue the injunction she issued, which is
one of the interesting questions on appeal. Anybody else? Yes, sir.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: With all the confidentiality involved in
these cases, is there any worry about the precedential effect on cases
going forward? And I know a lot of corporations choose to incorpo-
rate in Delaware because it has that large volume of case law that they
can rely on.
GREGORY VARALLO: You know, it's an interesting question,
and there was a professor up in Boston, I think, who took the view
that this was bad for Delaware because we would be limiting the
amount of jurisprudence that came out of the Court of Chancery,
thereby effectively undermining our franchise in the long run.
I actually was talking to the chancellor about this very point on
Monday, and he's a pretty animated guy. He said, "Yeah, let me get
this straight. We live or die on the quality and amount of our jurispru-
dence. We're going to allow that to happen, right?" And his point
was we're not going to get to that point where there is no public litiga-
tion or no fair volume of public litigation.
It is true that whatever happens in these stays private and can't be
cited as authority, and many of them, we simply had a bottom-line
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result as opposed to an opinion explaining the result. So you wouldn't
have precedent, and it was private anyway.
But I think that the thinking-and I think it's correct actually-is
that there are a category of cases that make a lot of sense for this kind
of alternative dispute resolution, and there are some that don't make
as much sense, and then there are a whole group of cases that are
never going to get here. For example, class actions by stockholders,
derivative actions, contests over elections, which are effectively the
bread and butter of what the Court of Chancery does. This largely is a
subset of highly specialized contractual disputes. And you know, hav-
ing one less contract case, okay, the law's a little bit poorer for it, but
it's certainly not going to affect it overall. The judgment, I think, is it
doesn't affect the overall franchise. Interesting question, though. An-
yone else? We've run over a little bit. Sam, thank you very much.

